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The special litigation committee, or SLC, developed as a defensive
mechanism for corporations to protect themselves against negative effects
of shareholder derivative litigation. This defensive mechanism is now being
deployed by some corporations offensively, as a means of attempting to
preempt shareholder rights before derivative litigation is even threatened.
Such “first strike” use of an SLC runs contrary to the principles and policies
that underlie the Minnesota law for SLCs.
In this article, we consider the question of how early a Minnesota
corporation may appoint a special litigation committee. We conclude that
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the decision of an SLC appointed by a Minnesota corporation should be
given no deference by a court unless the SLC is appointed after the
corporation receives a written threat or demand from a shareholder alleging
wrongful conduct upon which the shareholder relies as the basis for a
potential derivative action. A “First Strike” SLC—an SLC appointed prior
to the receipt of a written threat or demand from a shareholder—should be
treated as a nullity, or alternatively as a breach of the directors’ fiduciary
obligation not to waste corporate resources. These conclusions flow from
the structure and function of the special litigation committee because
Minnesota statutory and case law do not expressly address the question of
how early a special litigation committee may be appointed.
THE PROBLEM
Before considering the nuts and bolts of Minnesota law as it applies to
a First Strike SLC, it is helpful to sketch a typical context in which an SLC
might be deployed. The abbreviated three-scene drama begins:
For three years, Corporation has paid no shareholder distribu-
tions. Its business appears strong. Tom owns 20 percent of the
stock and resents the lack of tangible return on his investment. He
believes the CEO and directors are diverting Corporation’s cash
into their own pockets through contracts with other entities
owned by them and through improper expense reimbursements.
At the annual shareholder meeting, Tom blows his top, excoriat-
ing the lack of distributions and questioning the use of funds. The
directors assure him Corporation is being managed properly and
he just needs to be patient for distributions to come—but they
make no promises.
Traditionally, Scene 2 of this script would show Tom meeting with an
attorney and the attorney writing a letter to Corporation. The letter would
allege breaches of fiduciary duty and threaten “appropriate legal action” if
Corporation did not take action against the CEO and directors to recover its
damages from the breaches. The CEO and directors would respond by de-
nying any misdeeds, and Tom would file a derivative lawsuit attempting to
bring claims against them on behalf of Corporation.
In Scene 3, the board would appoint a special litigation committee to
investigate and evaluate Tom’s allegations. The SLC would eventually is-
sue a report either:
• absolving the directors and recommending dismissal of the deriva-
tive lawsuit;
• concluding that there could be merit to some of the claims, but the
claims were not worth pursuing; or
• affirming that the claims had merit, and the case should be pursued.
Recently, however, we have seen companies vault from Scene 1 (dis-
satisfied minority shareholder) to Scene 3 (appointment of an SLC) without
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litigation or the threat of litigation in Scene 2 ever happening. This troub-
ling development constitutes an abuse of the special litigation committee.
Further, it discredits the institution of the SLC by playing into and substan-
tiating the stereotype that an SLC is merely a charade by which the law
allows majority shareholders, without ever being held accountable, to bury
wrongs they have committed against minority shareholders.
SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES
Legally, a corporation is a person.1 It may sue or be sued like any other
person, and a legal action by or against it does not directly implicate its
shareholders, for they also are separate persons. Absent extremely unusual
circumstances, when a corporation is sued as a defendant its shareholders
are not liable. And when a corporation files suit as a plaintiff, the sharehold-
ers do not (directly) receive any money recovered as damages. “As a gen-
eral rule, ‘an individual shareholder may not assert a cause of action that
belongs to the corporation.’”2
Though a corporation is a legal person, it has no physical body. It
cannot act on its own. It acts only through others—through the officers who
manage it, through the employees who carry out its business, and (most
importantly in this context) through the directors who alone control its deci-
sion-making.3 When individuals who act on behalf of the corporation ma-
nipulate affairs for their own personal benefit at the corporation’s expense,4
the corporation is harmed, and the shareholders who own the corporation
suffer because the value of their stock declines.
These principles create a quandary. The directors control the corpora-
tion’s actions, but if the directors commit a wrong against the corporation,
they will never cause the corporation to sue themselves.5 The value of the
minority shareholders’ investment will be diminished, but the minority
shareholders lack the power to right this wrong because the corporation is
outside their control.
To resolve this quandary, corporate law allows shareholders, under
limited circumstances, to bring a “derivative” lawsuit on behalf of the cor-
1. See Corcoran v. P. G. Corcoran Co., 71 N.W.2d 787, 795 (Minn. 1955).
2. Blohm v. Kelly, 765 N.W.2d 147, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Nw. Racquet
Swim & Health Clubs, Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche, 535 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1995)).
3. “[C]ourts recognize the authority of corporate directors and want corporations to control
their own destiny.” Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 881 (Minn. 2003) [hereinafter
Janssen II].
4. For example, one shareholder plaintiff alleged the defendant “abused his position in the
corporation by paying himself excessive compensation and by using corporate assets to discharge
personal debts and debts of another business.” Blohm, 765 N.W.2d at 153.
5. “[I]f the duties of care and loyalty which directors owe to their corporations could be
enforced only in suits by the corporation, many wrongs done by directors would never be reme-
died.” Janssen II, 662 N.W.2d at 882 (quoting Barrett v. S. Conn. Gas Co., 374 A.2d 1051, 1055
(Conn. 1977)).
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poration. In a proper derivative lawsuit, the shareholder files the action and
controls it, but the actual party to the litigation is the corporation itself, and
any recovery that is made accrues to the benefit of the corporation, not the
individual shareholder.6
A derivative lawsuit wrenches power to govern the corporation (with
respect to the lawsuit) away from the directors. Accordingly, it is a dramatic
exception to the rule that the directors alone govern the corporation. The
filing of a derivative action typically initiates a struggle between the direc-
tors and the plaintiff shareholders over who will speak for the corporation
in the lawsuit. The directors wish to dismiss the action (if they had initially
agreed with it, they would have caused the corporation to file the action
directly, without any needed derivative filing by the shareholders), while
the plaintiff shareholders want the action to proceed.
Courts apply a number of complex rules to resolve the struggle be-
tween directors and shareholders over control of a derivative lawsuit. Gen-
erally, a shareholder must, before filing a derivative action, present the
directors with a demand that the corporation pursue the claims advocated by
the shareholder. If the shareholder does not first present a demand, the de-
rivative action will ordinarily be dismissed.7 Presentation of a shareholder
demand allows the directors an opportunity to voluntarily pursue direct
claims on behalf of the corporation and obviate any need for shareholders to
bring derivative claims. Demand “gives the management of the corporation
an opportunity to consider the merits of the dispute and to determine, in the
interests of the corporation and shareholders, whether it might be disposed
of without the expense and delay of litigation.”8 After receiving a share-
holder demand, the directors must exercise their business judgment in de-
ciding whether to (i) accede to the demand and cause the corporation to
follow the course demanded by the shareholder, or (ii) reject the demand
and cause the corporation to pursue some other course.9
6. See In re Medtronic, Inc. S’holder Litig., 900 N.W.2d 401, 408 (Minn. 2017).
7. “[A] shareholder must make a demand for relief to a company’s board of directors before
filing a derivative action on the company’s behalf. The demand requirement is excused only upon
a showing that it is plain from the circumstances that [demand] would be futile. A derivative suit
is available to a shareholder strictly as an extraordinary remedy when there is no other road to
redress.” In re Patterson Companies, Inc. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 1014,
1037–38 (D. Minn. 2007) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted); see also Markewich ex rel.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Collins, 622 F. Supp. 2d 802, 807, 814 (D. Minn. 2009). “Futility of demand”
or “demand excused” cases are discussed below.
8. Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am., 107 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Minn. 1961).
9. “The business judgment rule means that as long as the disinterested director(s) made an
informed business decision, in good faith, without an abuse of discretion, he or she will not be
liable for corporate losses resulting from his or her decision.” Janssen II, 662 N.W.2d at 882. For
many reasons, business judgment might counsel against the corporation pursuing litigation de-
manded by a shareholder. There may not be any arguable claim. There may be a claim—but of
value too low to justify the negative consequences of litigation—or distraction from the corpora-
tion’s focus on other business, negative publicity, exposure to claims by third parties, and finan-
cial expense. “[D]ismissal of meritorious litigation may be justifiable, such as when pursuit of the
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If a shareholder demands that the corporation pursue litigation against
the very directors who would ordinarily evaluate the shareholder’s demand,
the self-interest of those directors requires that they not participate in the
decision concerning that demand. The directors may therefore delegate their
decision-making authority concerning the demand to a special litigation
committee.10 In Minnesota, the members of an SLC may be “one or more
independent directors or other independent persons.”11
The SLC investigates the proposed claims and makes an impartial de-
termination whether the corporation ought to pursue them.12 In theory, an
SLC solves the problem of how directors, vested with sole power to govern
a corporation, can make an independent and impartial decision whether the
corporation, in its best interest, should sue the directors themselves without
the directors’ self-interest affecting the decision but also without infringing
upon their governing authority. “Special litigation committees thus enable
a corporation to dismiss or settle a derivative suit despite a conflict of inter-
est on the part of some or all directors.”13 Special litigation committees
“provide for an independent evaluation of a derivative action” and “balance
the rights and duties of the board and the dissenting shareholder” by al-
lowing the corporation to “rid itself of meritless or harmful litigation,” yet
also preventing directors from seizing control of “bona fide derivative
claims away from well-meaning plaintiffs.”14
To summarize, a derivative action filed without the shareholder first
presenting a demand to the corporation’s directors will ordinarily be dis-
missed. If a shareholder presents a demand, the corporation appoints an
SLC, the SLC recommends that the corporation not pursue the share-
holder’s demand, and the shareholder files a derivative action, then the
court will defer to the decision of the SLC that the corporation should not
pursue litigation if the corporation can show the SLC members “possessed a
disinterested independence” and conducted an “adequate, appropriate” in-
vestigation “pursued in good faith.”15 On the basis of the SLC’s report and
claim will prove more costly than beneficial.” In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. S’holder Derivative
Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 559 (Minn. 2008) [hereinafter In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc.]; see, e.g.,
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:18, at 822
(Thomson Reuters, 2018–2019 ed., 2018) (“The suit was settled a year after it was filed; the
company recovered a total of $23 [million] . . . . Although $23 million is a large monetary recov-
ery, it is dwarfed by the legal fees paid by the company, reportedly more than $30 million to its
own litigation counsel and $8 million to two shareholder plaintiffs’ firms.”).
10. Blohm v. Kelly, 765 N.W.2d 147, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
11. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subd. 1. The name “special litigation committee” may conjure
the image of a group of investigators, but the statute clearly allows a committee to consist of
“one” individual if the corporation chooses not to have “more.”
12. Janssen II, 662 N.W.2d at 884.
13. In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 550–51 (Minn. 2008).
14. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 645 N.W.2d 495, 498–99 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) [hereinafter
Janssen I].
15. In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 561.
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recommendation, the court will preclude the disgruntled shareholder from
proceeding with her derivative claims.16
STRUCTURAL BIAS?
The fact that an SLC is selected and appointed by the directors the
SLC is tasked to investigate means that the selection of the SLC members
will sometimes be influenced by the directors’ consideration of whether
particular individuals are likely to recommend dismissal of the derivative
action. Directors cannot dictate the SLC’s decision—but they can appoint
an SLC that they believe will be inclined to reach a conclusion the directors
approve. The directors can select individuals with known views, individuals
similarly situated to themselves, or individuals with an established positive
relationship with the corporate counsel, who acts as the liaison to gather
documents and answer questions for the SLC during the course of its inves-
tigation. Under such circumstances, the board may reasonably expect that
its carefully-selected SLC is likely to recommend the corporation not pur-
sue litigation of the derivative claim.
“It is unusual, but not altogether unknown, for a committee to recom-
mend action against incumbent directors and employees.”17 As a result,
plaintiff shareholders often maintain, sometimes not unreasonably, that an
SLC was predisposed to favor the directors over the shareholders. However,
in Minnesota, a shareholder must show a lack of independence by the spe-
cific individuals who made up the SLC in order to attack an SLC’s conclu-
sion. The Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected the argument that
generalized considerations of “structural bias”18 allow a court to infer a lack
of independence and scrutinize the business merits of an SLC’s decision.19
Given this background Minnesota law concerning SLCs, and giving
due consideration to self-interest in the sharp-elbowed business world, we
should expect that:
• directors accused of wrongdoing by a shareholder will consider the
SLC a useful tool for disposing of the accusations;
• directors and the attorneys who advise them will understand that
selecting SLC members favorably disposed toward the directors
can have a material effect on the SLC’s conclusions; and
16. See id.
17. DEMOTT, supra note 9, at 818.
18. “[T]he ‘structural bias’ argument suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that the mem-
bers of independent committees are free from personal, financial or moral influences which flow
from the directors who appoint them.” In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 558 (quota-
tion omitted).
19. The Court concluded that judges should not question the business rationale of an SLC’s
recommendation because “judges really are not equipped either by training or experience to make
business judgments,” and “careful scrutiny of an SLC’s independence and investigative proce-
dures is a sufficient protection against any structural bias.” Id. at 556, 558.
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• potential SLC candidates, particularly individuals in the business of
routinely and regularly serving on SLCs for various and sundry
corporations, or routinely at the behest of certain law firms on be-
half of those firms’ clients, will understand that a reputation for
siding with shareholders against directors may result in fewer fu-
ture engagements.
These considerations ought to color our analysis of the First Strike
SLC and how early a Minnesota corporation may appoint an SLC. A corpo-
ration undertaking the inconvenience and expense of establishing an SLC
without even having received a written threat or demand from a shareholder
has the appearance of an entity seeking to obtain a specific result desired by
the directors—not an entity disinterestedly acting for the benefit of all
shareholders.
EXPANSION OF THE SLC DEVICE
The use of SLCs appears to be growing in Minnesota. Eleven Minne-
sota appellate decisions contain the phrase “special litigation committee.”
Three were decided in the 1990s.20 Three concerned the same action, Jans-
sen v. Best & Flanagan, and were decided in 2002, 2003, and 2005.21 Five
were decided in 2008 or thereafter.22 One additional case, from 1988, ad-
dressed the concept of an SLC but called it a “committee of disinterested
persons” rather than an SLC.23 Search of Minnesota trial court orders
searchable in Westlaw as of August 15, 2019 shows thirty-six orders using
the phrase “special litigation committee.” Of these thirty-six, fully twenty-
nine were issued in 2008 or later. The federal court for the District of Min-
nesota has issued twenty-three opinions using the phrase “special litigation
committee.” Thirteen were issued in 2008 or thereafter, with the other ten
between 1978 and 2007.
As directors and corporate counsel become familiar with and accus-
tomed to the use of an SLC, they may resort to the appointment of an SLC
earlier and earlier in the process of resolving a dispute with a minority
shareholder. Twice in recent years we have personally encountered situa-
tions where a corporation or company appointed an SLC without receiving
any formal demand or threat of litigation from a shareholder. These compa-
nies convened SLCs based merely on the emergence of disagreement be-
20. Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Wessin v. Archives Corp.,
581 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d 592 N.W.2d 460; Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d
17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
21. Janssen I, 645 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); Janssen II, 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.
2003); Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 704 N.W.2d 759 (Minn. 2005) [hereinafter Janssen III].
22. Blum v. Thompson, 901 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017); Toretta v. Lachinski, No.
A12-0779, 2013 WL 491523 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2013); Ring v. Kaplan, No. A11-804, 2012
WL 763582 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2012); Blohm v. Kelly, 765 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. Ct. App.
2009); In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d 544.
23. Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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tween a minority shareholder and the controlling shareholder or bloc of
shareholders. In one instance, the controlling owner caused the company to
appoint an SLC purportedly in response to oral allegations of wrongdoing
articulated by the non-controlling owner. However, the non-controlling
owner denied making any such allegations. In the SLC report that was ulti-
mately issued, the SLC claimed that threats of litigation had been made by
representatives of the non-controlling owner. The SLC purported to rely on
“interviews with key witnesses”—not including the non-controlling
owner—to ascertain the substance of the non-controlling owner’s purported
threats. In a second instance, the controlling shareholder bloc caused the
company to appoint an SLC allegedly in response to a letter from the non-
controlling shareholder’s attorney demanding a buyout of his shares. The
letter alleged various forms of shareholder oppression by the controlling
shareholder bloc but did not threaten litigation.
In both of these instances, the companies’ quick resort to the appoint-
ment of an SLC surprised the non-controlling shareholders. The disputes
had not yet ripened to the point of any non-controlling shareholder sending
a demand letter or a written threat of litigation. From the non-controlling
shareholders’ perspectives, there was not yet any subject for the SLCs to
investigate. The companies’ hasty appointments of SLCs appeared to be
first-strike, strategic aggressions intended to give the controlling sharehold-
ers a broad-brush exculpation and to deprive the non-controlling sharehold-
ers of rights before the non-controlling shareholders were even aware of
what their rights might be or made any attempt to assert them. The control-
ling shareholders apparently saw the early appointment of SLCs as get-out-
of-jail-free cards for themselves, which could be wielded to thwart any at-
tempt by the non-controlling shareholders to initiate litigation, absolving
the controlling shareholders of any potential claims whether those claims
could be clearly articulated or not.
MINNESOTA CASE AND STATUTORY LAW PROVIDES NO GUIDANCE
CONCERNING FIRST STRIKE SLCS
These two instances are a disturbing development. Experienced corpo-
rate counsel manipulated the SLC—a legal device outside the familiarity of
many lawyers and certainly outside the familiarity of the non-controlling
owners—to create an impression or appearance of legal invulnerability,
where that was not actually the case at all. How many other minority share-
holders have been intimidated into abandoning legitimate grievances
against their corporations by directors’ premature deployment of an SLC
cloaked in the purported armor of judicial deference? That empirical ques-
tion is impossible to answer, but we can analyze the related legal questions
“How early may a corporation appoint an SLC?” and “How early is too
early?” under existing Minnesota law. Doing so reveals that case and statu-
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-1\UST106.txt unknown Seq: 9 28-JAN-20 12:00
2019] FIRST STRIKE SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES 77
tory law do not yet provide clear answers, but the principles and purposes
underlying SLCs provide useful guidance.
Case Law
Our analysis begins with a quick tracing of the high points in Minne-
sota case law related to SLCs. The number of cases is not large.24
In 1961, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed that only a corpora-
tion, not the shareholders, may bring a lawsuit for wrongs committed
against the corporation, and that a shareholder seeking to address a wrong
committed against the corporation generally must first present a demand to
the board of directors before commencing derivative litigation.25
In 1988, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality
of Minnesota’s statutory authorization for corporations to use SLCs and
followed Delaware, California, and New York in limiting judicial review of
an SLC’s decisions to the questions of whether the SLC was disinterested
and whether it conducted its investigation in good faith, expressly preclud-
ing judicial consideration of the merits of the SLC’s recommendation.26
In 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed that Minnesota judicial consid-
eration of an SLC’s decision is limited to assessing the independence of the
SLC and whether its investigation was conducted in good faith.27 The court
again reaffirmed this principle in 199928 and 2009.29
In 2003, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a corporation gets
only one bite at the SLC apple. If the corporation relies upon an SLC report
which a court finds to be deficient either for lack of independence from the
board’s control or for inadequate investigation, the court must disregard the
SLC and allow the shareholder’s derivative action to proceed, and the cor-
poration may not go back and re-do the SLC report to try to remedy its
deficiencies.30
In 2008, the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved whether Minnesota
law allows a court to review the substantive business merits of an SLC’s
decision. This opinion was delivered in response to a question certified by
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court framed this question as a choice between the approach fol-
lowed by New York (which prohibits consideration of the merits of an
SLC’s decision) and the approach followed by Delaware (which permits the
24. ”[S]hareholder-derivative litigation is not an everyday occurrence in Minnesota’s courts.”
Janssen II, 662 N.W.2d at 882; Markewich ex rel. Medtronic, Inc. v. Collins, 622 F. Supp. 2d 802,
808 (D. Minn. 2009) (“Derivative actions are uncommon in Minnesota.”).
25. Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union, 107 N.W.2d 226, 266–67 (Minn. 1961).
26. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 214.
27. Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
28. Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
29. Blohm v. Kelly, 765 N.W.2d 147, 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
30. Janssen II, 662 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 2003).
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court to apply its own business judgment to evaluate an SLC’s decision).
The Court opted to follow New York, explaining, “courts are not qualified
to evaluate the business judgment of an SLC.”31
None of these opinions, directly or indirectly, address the issue of the
First Strike SLC. Nor do state or federal cases from outside of Minnesota
provide any discussion of a First Strike SLC. To date, the issue of the tim-
ing of an SLC appears to have been litigated solely in the context of late-
formed SLCs. For reasons of efficiency, courts will generally grant a corpo-
ration’s request to stay an already-commenced derivative action to allow
time for a newly-appointed SLC to conduct an investigation and make a
decision whether the corporation should pursue the derivative claims.32 A
stay may be granted even if the corporation delays appointing the SLC for
some time as the litigation proceeds, but if the corporation allows the pro-
ceedings to advance too far before appointing an SLC, the court may de-
cline to grant a stay.33 In any event, the considerations of delay and waiver
that attend a late-filed SLC provide no guidance concerning the permissibil-
ity of a First Strike SLC.
Statute
Minnesota’s statutory provisions governing SLCs also fail to provide
unambiguous direction concerning the permissibility of a First Strike SLC.
The most relevant statute, Minn. Stat. § 302A.241, subd. 1, does not
state any threshold prerequisite for a corporation to appoint an SLC. It pro-
vides that a corporation’s board may “establish committees having the au-
thority of the board in the management of the business of the corporation
only to the extent provided in the resolution,” and that
Committees may include a special litigation committee consisting
of one or more independent directors or other independent per-
sons to consider legal rights or remedies of the corporation and
31. In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d 544, 556 (Minn. 2008).
32. See, e.g., Abbey v. Comput. & Commc’n Tech. Corp., 457 A.2d 368, 375 (Del. Ch.
1983); Milliken v. Am. Realty Capital Hosp. Advisors, LLC, No. 18-CV-1757, 2018 WL
3745669, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2018) (“Under these circumstances, courts almost always stay
proceedings to afford SLCs ‘a reasonable time to carry out [their] function.’”); In re UnitedHealth
Grp. Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 06-CV-1216, 2007 WL 803048, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 14,
2007); Warren v. Acova, Inc., No. 27-CV-18-3944, 2018 WL 8950613, at *3 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Oct.
17, 2018).
33. See, e.g., Katz v. Renyi, 722 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (“Given the
bank’s delay in appointing the SLC and the makeup of the SLC, which includes members whose
impartiality is suspect, the motion court’s exercise of discretion in denying the requested stay was
appropriate.”); Rosenbloom v. Pyott, No. SA CV 10-1352-DOC (MLGx), 2014 WL 10988342, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2014) (“Stays are usually only denied under ‘unusual circumstances,’ such
as when the corporation unduly delayed establishing an SLC until after significant motions prac-
tice and discovery had occurred or if the SLC members themselves are biased.”). In Blohm v.
Kelly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by enter-
ing a stay to allow an SLC investigation one week before the scheduled trial. 765 N.W.2d at 155.
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whether those rights and remedies should be pursued. Committees
other than special litigation committees . . . are subject at all times
to the direction and control of the board.
Similar statutory provisions apply to cooperative associations and nonprofit
corporations.34
On its face, the language of Section 302A.241, subd. 1 might appear to
allow a corporation to establish an SLC at any time the corporation deems it
necessary for “consider[ing] legal rights or remedies of the corporation,”
but such a negative inference is not supportable here. Other constraints im-
posed on SLCs by case law are not included in the statute,35 and the legisla-
ture has indicated that it wishes the courts to develop Minnesota law
concerning SLCs.36 There is no reasonable basis to freight Sec-
tion 302A.241, subd. 1 with a negative inference based on the absence of
language addressing the possibility of a First Strike SLC.
The limited legislative history available for the current version of Sec-
tion 302A.241 sheds no light on the question of a first-strike SLC. A prior
version of Section 302A.243 contained language that implied an SLC could
only be established in response to a “particular proceeding”—implicitly, a
derivative action:
Unless prohibited by the articles or bylaws, the board may estab-
lish a committee composed of two or more disinterested directors
or other disinterested persons to determine whether it is in the
best interests of the corporation to pursue a particular legal right
or remedy of the corporation and whether to cause the dismissal
or discontinuance of a particular proceeding that seeks to assert a
right or remedy on behalf of the corporation.37
This provision was repealed in 1989 with the instruction by the legislature
that repeal “does not imply that the legislature has accepted or rejected the
substance of the repealed Section,” and that the revised law “must be inter-
preted in the same manner as if Section 302A.243 had not be[en] en-
acted.”38 Based on that instruction, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
concluded that its jurisprudence prior to the repeal remained good law.39
Accordingly, neither the language of the old Section 302A.243 nor the fact
of its repeal provides useful guidance concerning the meaning of the current
statutory provisions governing SLCs appointed by Minnesota corporations.
34. MINN. STAT. § 308B.451, subd. 1; MINN. STAT. § 317A.241, subd. 1.
35. The one-SLC-chance-only rule articulated in Janssen I is a prime example.
36. Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (modification of SLC
statute by legislature indicated “a commitment to let the caselaw develop” and “a desire to give
our courts flexibility”).
37. See 1981 Minn. Laws 1168; 1982 Minn. Laws 546.
38. 1989 Minn. Laws 429.
39. Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at
506.
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Comparison of Minnesota’s authorization for corporations to use SLCs
with the state’s authorization for other types of business entities to use
SLCs reveals interesting but ultimately unreliable contrasts. The old Minne-
sota Limited Liability Company Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 322B, tracked the lan-
guage of the current corporate statute, Section 302A, providing that a
limited liability company could appoint a “special litigation committee con-
sisting of one or more independent governors or other independent persons
to consider legal rights or remedies of the limited liability company and
whether those rights and remedies should be pursued.”40
However, in 2014 the legislature replaced chapter 322B,41 adopting in
its place the Minnesota Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act,
Minn. Stat. ch. 322C.42 The revised statute provides, “If a limited liability
company is named as or made a party in a derivative proceeding, the com-
pany may appoint a special litigation committee to investigate the claims
asserted in the proceeding and determine whether pursuing the action is in
the best interests of the company.”43 This language seems to require the
actual commencement of derivative litigation before an LLC may appoint
an SLC.
Based on the difference between Sections 322C.0905, subd. 1
and 302A.241, subd. 1, one might argue that corporations are not required
to wait until the commencement of derivative litigation to appoint an SLC,
because the corporate statute omits the specific language contained in the
LLC statute. Such an argument would be unfounded. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court has held that language differences between different Minne-
sota enabling statutes with respect to SLCs do not necessarily indicate the
legislature intended to treat different types of entities differently.44 In 2003,
the statute governing for-profit corporations (Section 302A.241) expressly
authorized the use of an SLC, while the statute governing non-profit corpo-
rations (Section 317A.241) omitted this provision, ultimately leading to the
court addressing whether omission of the SLC language from the non-profit
corporation statute indicated that non-profit corporations could not rely
upon an SLC.45 The lower court had concluded, from the difference in lan-
guage, that non-profit corporations could not.46 The Minnesota Supreme
40. Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, MINN. STAT. § 322B.66, subd. 1 (repealed
2018).
41. Chapter 322B is being phased out. Chapter 322C provided that LLCs formed on or after
August 1, 2015 had to be formed under Chapter 322C, but allowed a transitional window in which
LLCs formed prior to August 1, 2015 were allowed to elect between remaining subject to chapter
322B or becoming subject to chapter 322C. The transitional election window closed on January 1,
2018, when LLCs that had elected to remain subject to chapter 322B became subject to chapter
322C with certain exceptions. See MINN. STAT. § 322C.1204 (2018).
42. 2014 Minn. Laws 1.
43. MINN. STAT. § 322C.0905, subd. 1 (emphasis added).
44. Janssen II, 662 N.W.2d 876, 886 (Minn. 2003).
45. Id. at 886.
46. Id.
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Court disagreed, deciding there were “no characteristics of nonprofits that
justify treating nonprofit and for-profit corporations differently in terms of
their ability to delegate board authority to independent committees to re-
view the merits of derivative suits.”47 Noting that the law of derivative liti-
gation, the business judgment rule, and SLCs developed through judicial
decisions rather than statutes, the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed Min-
nesota non-profit corporations to use SLCs notwithstanding the sharp con-
trast between Sections 302A.241, subd. 1, and 317A.241.48 In light of
Janssen, one cannot confidently conclude that the difference between the
LLC statute and Section 302A.241, subd. 1 supports a negative inference
about when a corporation may form an SLC.
THE FUNCTION OF THE SLC PRECLUDES USE OF A FIRST STRIKE SLC
In the absence of reliable direction from case law or statute, considera-
tion of the function of an SLC provides the best available guidance con-
cerning how early an SLC may be appointed by a Minnesota corporation
and whether a First Strike SLC is permissible. Underlying principles sup-
port the conclusion that a corporation should not rely upon an SLC formed
prior to the receipt from a shareholder of a written threat of litigation or
demand that the board take action concerning an identifiable derivative
claim.
To begin, it is clear that an SLC may be formed prior to the actual
commencement of a derivative action, because “a shareholder bringing a
derivative action must first demand that the board itself pursue the ac-
tion.”49 A board of directors presented with such a demand must decide
whether to accede to it. If directors have a conflict of interest that prevents
them from participating in the decision concerning the demand, then ap-
pointment of an SLC is the appropriate means—perhaps the only appropri-
ate means—for the board to analyze the shareholder’s demand in an
impartial fashion. Because the shareholder’s demand must precede filing of
a derivative action, necessarily the appointment of an SLC prior to filing
must also be permissible.
On the other hand, it is also clear that a corporation cannot appoint an
SLC until it particularly identifies a potential derivative claim for the SLC
to investigate. To see this, consider whether a board of directors could ap-
point a standing SLC for the corporation in the same way that it might
appoint a standing finance committee, compensation committee, or execu-
tive committee. A standing SLC is impossible because the defining charac-
teristic of an SLC is impartiality. SLC members must be free from any
conflict of interest arising out of the allegations they are tasked to investi-
47. Id. at 886–87.
48. Id. at 888.
49. In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d 544, 550 n.5 (Minn. 2008).
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gate. Until the nature of the allegations and claims is known, the corpora-
tion cannot determine whether any particular individual is free from a
conflict of interest with respect to those allegations and claims, so no partic-
ular individual can be appointed to a standing SLC. Until a set of potential
allegations and claims is defined, it is not knowable who is eligible to serve
on the SLC.50
Identification of a specific potential derivative claim for the SLC to
investigate carries critical importance. It is not enough to charge an SLC to
investigate any and all potential wrongdoing. Such a commission would not
give the SLC any direction concerning who to interview, what questions to
ask, what documents to request, what conduct or harm to search for, and
when to conclude the investigation. An SLC lacking specific claims to in-
vestigate would be a blind watchman. In practice, an undefined mandate
would not at all be useful in actually unearthing wrongdoing, but—per-
versely—a report issued by an SLC with an undefined mandate could be
argued by the board of directors to preclude any and all derivative actions,
since in theory the undefined mandate would cover every type of potential
wrongful conduct within the company.
Thus in purely theoretical terms the earliest point at which a corpora-
tion could establish an SLC would be the point at which a derivative claim
is defined and understood well enough to allow the corporation to identify
SLC members who are disinterested in that claim and to generally identify
the potential wrongdoing the SLC is supposed to investigate. We can go
one step further. As a practical matter, there are at least three reasons a
corporation must defer appointing an SLC until the corporation receives a
written demand or threat of litigation from a shareholder.
Fiduciary Factor
The first reason is the expense of an SLC investigation. A properly
conducted investigation will likely require the retention of qualified profes-
sionals to gather and review documentation related to the claim and to inter-
view potential witnesses. These procedures are expensive. Because the
board of directors owes a fiduciary duty to all shareholders not to waste
corporate resources,51 the directors have an obligation to refrain from incur-
50. Could a corporation select individuals with no connection whatsoever to the corporation
to serve as a standing SLC, on the theory that no derivative action could ever implicate those
individuals? No. The corporation still could not know in advance whether these individuals would
be eligible to serve on an SLC because it cannot know what future events might transpire to draw
these individuals into a conflict of interest, even if no conflict exists at the moment of selection.
Moreover, the very act of identifying those individuals as a standing SLC would establish a con-
nection between them and the corporation. That relationship could become relevant to a derivative
claim. Further, the corporation could not be certain, at the time of appointment, that the selected
individuals would be willing and able to act as an SLC for a hypothetical future derivative claim.
51. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1 (court may grant equitable relief if share-
holder establishes “corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted”).
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ring the expense of an SLC until it becomes clear that the expense is rea-
sonably necessary. Prior to receipt of a written threat or demand from a
shareholder, the expense of an SLC is not a reasonable use of corporate
funds because (except for limited circumstances discussed below) the share-
holder cannot file a derivative action without first presenting the board with
a written demand that the board pursue the claims advocated by the
shareholder.
The directors will have an opportunity to appoint an SLC after they
receive a written demand; therefore, a board that leaps ahead to the appoint-
ment of an SLC prior to receiving a written threat or demand causes the
company to unreasonably incur the significant expense of the SLC and sig-
nals a lack of good faith. It may be that no derivative litigation or share-
holder threat or demand will ever occur, in which case the SLC expense
will have been unnecessary. “[G]ood faith is a prerequisite to the applica-
tion of the business judgment rule,” and the business judgment rule is the
foundation on which the device of the SLC stands.52 A written articulation
of shareholder allegations that contains an express or implied request or
demand that the corporation take action regarding the allegations is the
point at which the expense of an SLC becomes reasonably justifiable in
good faith.
Consistency Factor
The interdependent relationship between SLCs and derivative litiga-
tion provides a second reason that a corporation should be precluded from
relying on an SLC appointed before the board receives a written threat or
demand from a shareholder. The raison d’etre of an SLC is to provide a
conflicted board of directors with a means of dealing with the threat of
derivative litigation. The legal principles limiting SLCs should, therefore,
be consistent with the legal principles limiting derivative actions. Demand
is a prerequisite for a derivative action; accordingly, a written threat or de-
mand should be a prerequisite for the device of the SLC, which is designed
to respond to the possibility of derivative litigation.
It might be argued that a shareholder could make demand upon the
board of directors without providing a written communication. While Min-
nesota cases do not address this possibility, it is extremely unlikely. The
Delaware courts, to which Minnesota courts often look for guidance on
matters of corporate law, have developed a jurisprudence defining what
qualifies as a shareholder demand. Delaware has imposed stringent require-
ments that to qualify as a shareholder demand, a shareholder communica-
tion must identify wrongdoers, describe the factual basis of the allegedly
52. In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 553; see id. at 553–54, 559 (“the business
judgment rule requires, at a bare minimum, that an SLC be independent and act in good faith”).
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wrongful acts and the harm caused, and request remedial relief.53 The con-
sequences of treating a communication as a shareholder demand are quite
weighty. Courts applying Delaware law accordingly do not treat a commu-
nication as a shareholder demand unless the communication clearly dis-
charges the function of identifying the action sought by the shareholder
from the directors and the factual basis for seeking the action.54 The exacti-
tude of this inquiry is illustrated by a case in which the court concluded that
a letter written to the board of directors did not qualify under Delaware law
as a demand letter, notwithstanding that the letter asked the company to
commence litigation and identified alleged wrongdoers. The letter’s short-
coming? Its description of alleged wrongful conduct by reference to a pend-
ing antitrust class action lawsuit did not “sufficiently identify” the factual
basis of the allegedly wrongful acts.55 There is no reason to believe that
Minnesota will chart a radically different course allowing a shareholder de-
mand to be presented through the informal, inexact, and unpreserved
method of oral communication. Thus it is difficult to imagine how a non-
written communication could fulfill the function of demand and clear the
path for a shareholder to file a derivative lawsuit.
It might also be objected that Minnesota law theoretically allows a
shareholder to file a derivative action without first making a demand under
certain limited circumstances that are said to “excuse” demand.56 These cir-
cumstances occur when the alleged wrongdoers “constitute a majority of
the board.”57 The theory of “demand excused” or “demand futile” deriva-
tive litigation in Minnesota is questionable, since a conflicted board of di-
rectors can appoint an independent SLC in response to a shareholder’s
demand even if a majority of the board is accused of wrongdoing. The fed-
eral court in Minnesota has more than once in recent years questioned
53. See Allison v. Gen. Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1117 (D. Del. 1985); Iron Workers
Mid-S. Pension Fund v. Davis, Civ. No. 13-289 (JRT/JJG), 2013 WL 6858567, at *5 (D. Minn.
Dec. 30, 2013); Shenk v. Karmazin, 867 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
54. “Given the significant consequence of making a demand under Delaware law, the Court
of Chancery has expressed serious reservations about ‘construing ambiguous communications to
be demands.’” Nemazee v. Premier, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). “To interpret
an ambiguous communication as a demand would discourage a shareholder from bringing poten-
tial wrongdoing to the corporation’s attention in a forum other than the courtroom, for fear that his
position, should he later decide to sue derivatively, would procedurally be more difficult to sup-
port. Furthermore, to require a board to investigate claims asserted ambiguously in an equivocal
communication would not be an efficient use of corporate resources, because the board would lack
the information necessary to make a good faith inquiry. Therefore, an ambiguous communication
(i.e., one which does not clearly and specifically embody the three essential elements discussed
above) ought not to be considered a demand within the meaning of Rule 23.1.” Yaw v. Talley,
Civ.A. No. 12882, 1994 WL 89019, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1994).
55. Shenk, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
56. In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 550 n.5.
57. Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union, 107 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Minn. 1961).
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whether demand can ever be excused in Minnesota,58 and at least two Min-
nesota trial courts have held or implied that demand is never futile because
an SLC can always be appointed.59
Even assuming that “demand excused” litigation is a possibility in
cases where a majority of the directors are conflicted because they are al-
leged wrongdoers, these cases present the maximum likelihood that a board
will attempt to use an SLC to bury director misconduct. Accordingly, the
possibility of “demand excused” litigation does not weigh against a rule
requiring the directors to receive a written threat or demand from a share-
holder prior to establishing an SLC. If demand truly is excused because a
majority of the board is conflicted, then that majority should be forced to
wait until demand is made or a derivative action is initiated before de-
ploying an SLC. The looming supervisory presence of the court is highly
desirable in such cases to motivate the appointment of a truly impartial SLC
and the conduct of a truly impartial investigation. If a majority of the board
believes a majority of the board has engaged in wrongdoing, the board’s
response should be to have the company initiate action to remedy the
wrongdoing or to appoint an independent investigatory committee,60 not to
appoint an SLC. The threshold requirement for establishment of an SLC by
a corporation to address a perceived threat of derivative litigation should
match the threshold requirement for a shareholder to actually file a deriva-
tive action—a written demand.
Deference Factor
The third reason that a corporation should be precluded from relying
on an SLC appointed before the board receives a written threat or demand is
the weighty importance of judicial deference to a body appointed outside
58. “According to § 10.3 of Minnesota Corporation Law and Practice, because Minnesota
law enables a corporation to establish an SLC, ‘it is arguable that demand in Minnesota is never
futile since someone not implicated in the lawsuit (i.e., one or more outsiders) always can be
commissioned to investigate and to decide whether to pursue or to seek the dismissal of derivative
actions initiated by shareholders against directors or officers.’” In re Medtronic, Inc. Derivative
Litig., 68 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1067 (D. Minn. 2014) (citing JOHN H. MATHESON & PHILIP S.
GARON, 18 MINN. PRAC., CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE § 10:3 (3d ed. 2013); Kococinski v.
Collins, 935 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917 n.13 (D. Minn. 2013) (“In fact, it is arguable that demand is
never futile in Minnesota because Section 302A.241, subdivision 1, may allow a board with no
disinterested members to appoint an independent nonboard member to serve on a special litigation
committee.”).
59. “In light of Minn. Stat. § 302A.241, demand is not futile even if a majority of a Minne-
sota corporation’s directors are implicated in the alleged wrongdoing, because a special litigation
committee of disinterested directors and/or unaffiliated persons can always be appointed to con-
sider a demand.” La. Mun. Police Employees Ret. Sys. v. Finkelstein, No. 27-CV-11-23986, 2012
WL 10057353, at *4 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 29, 2012); see also In re BUCA, Inc. S’holder Deriva-
tive Litig., No. 05-4418, 2005 WL 6750825 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Nov. 9, 2005) (“It is not inconceiv-
able that even the most rogue board given these circumstances might upon receipt of a demand,
decide to cut their losses and, for example, appoint a special litigation committee.”).
60. See the discussion of In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. below.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-1\UST106.txt unknown Seq: 18 28-JAN-20 12:00
86 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1
the judicial system, which has a recognized tendency to exculpate majority
shareholders and directors.
The role played by an SLC in the judicial system is quite remarkable.
When a dispute between a minority shareholder and the board of directors
arrives before a judge, Minnesota law instructs the judge to defer to the
decision made regarding that dispute by a body which has been selected by
one of the litigants. As noted above, there are good reasons for this practice,
rooted in the business judgment rule, but that does not change the uncom-
fortable fact that one party has been given the power to select the judge in
its own case. Judicial deference in effect (though not in theory) amounts to
a delegation of judicial authority.
The power of a board of directors to select SLC members opens a door
to the insidious arrangement of friends retaining friends to acquit them. If a
board leaps to the use of an SLC before it receives even a written request or
demand from a shareholder, the board’s haste suggests that the board is
seeking to bury allegations before they can be fully developed and clearly
articulated in a fair, accountable, and open process.
An SLC appointed in the absence of a written shareholder demand or
litigation threat also implicates considerations of the directors using their
own self-interested judgment to define the SLC’s scope of investigation,
another means by which the directors could influence the decision in their
own case. An SLC appointed with a mandate that is too narrow or that is
pointed in the wrong direction may easily yield an investigation that fails to
find wrongdoing that a properly directed SLC would find. An SLC ap-
pointed with a mandate that is too broad or indeterminate may not know
where to look, thereby allowing wrongdoing to remain undetected while
issuing an exculpating report. In either instance, the directors may rely upon
the SLC report finding no wrongdoing as justification for the corporation
not pursuing subsequent derivative allegations brought by a shareholder—
even if the shareholder correctly identifies wrongdoing that the SLC failed
to find. Unless an SLC’s scope and focus of investigation is the direct result
of a shareholder’s written allegations, a court should not, in deference to the
SLC, preclude the shareholder from bringing derivative claims related to
those allegations.
A corporation’s directors may appoint whatever committees they wish
at any time they wish, subject to their fiduciary duties. The corporation may
appoint an investigatory committee to investigate anything the directors
deem necessary. But committees other than SLCs have no intrinsic power
aside from whatever corporate powers are delegated by the directors.61
SLCs are different. They should be limited accordingly. Given the weighty
significance of judicial deference to SLC decisions, it is necessary to cabin
61. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subd. 1 (2018).
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the deployment of the SLC in bright-line fashion. A clear boundary for how
early an SLC may be appointed is an appropriate limitation.
A rule that courts will only defer to an SLC appointed after the corpo-
ration receives a written demand or threat of litigation from a shareholder
would best accommodate the competing considerations of the directors’ au-
thority to govern the corporation, the directors’ fiduciary obligation not to
waste corporate resources on an unnecessary SLC, and the legal framework
that requires a shareholder to send a demand to the corporation before
bringing a derivative action. It would further the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s policy of limiting judicial review of SLC decisions to consideration
of the SLC’s “independence and investigative procedures,” and it would
flesh out the court’s jurisprudence that an “improperly constituted SLC” is
entitled to “no deference” from the courts, by helping define a properly
constituted SLC.62 Such a rule would limit the use of the SLC in a salutary
way, cutting against a too-hasty deployment of the device in a manner that
smacks of abuse, while also providing clarity and comfort to boards of di-
rectors seeking clear guidance concerning their rights and responsibilities
related to the use of an SLC.
GOOD FAITH INVESTIGATION
What of the board’s fiduciary duty? Isn’t a board that learns of poten-
tial wrongdoing obligated to investigate the matter? Indeed. But a distinc-
tion can be drawn between investigation of a matter and appointment of an
SLC. Prior to receipt of any written demand or threat of litigation from a
shareholder, a board of directors may investigate potential wrongdoing by
the company without establishing an SLC.
The In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. litigation provides an example.
When “a Wall Street Journal article reported that certain executives, some
of whom were employed at UnitedHealth Group, Inc. . . . had received
advantageously-timed stock options,” the company’s board of directors
made an “initial public response to these disclosures” of “appoint[ing] a
committee of independent directors . . . to investigate the allegations.”63
This investigatory committee was not an SLC; nevertheless, the investiga-
tory committee retained a law firm to interview relevant individuals and
issue a report.64 Separately, “[i]n further response to the shareholder deriva-
tive actions,” the UnitedHealth board of directors appointed an SLC with
authority to decide “whether to pursue the action on the company’s be-
half.”65 A board seeking to fulfill its fiduciary duty and investigate allega-
tions of wrongdoing can and should appoint a committee of independent
62. In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d 544, 554, 558–59 (Minn. 2008).
63. In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1026–27
(D. Minn. 2008).
64. Id. at 1027.
65. Id.
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directors to accomplish that task without treating the investigatory commit-
tee as an SLC.
CONCLUSION
Special litigation committees were never intended by the legislature or
the courts to be used offensively. Weaponized use of an SLC as a first strike
to deter shareholders from asserting their rights is inconsistent with the pur-
pose and function of the SLC within the structure of Minnesota corporate
law, as defined by judicial decisions and statute. It does violence to the
spirit of the SLC. It indulges the basest motives of directors accused of
wrongdoing, allowing those very directors to guide the SLC’s investigation
so as to assure they will be preemptively absolved of wrongdoing.
The decision or recommendation of an SLC appointed by a Minnesota
corporation should be given no deference by a court unless the SLC is ap-
pointed after the corporation receives a written threat or demand from a
shareholder that identifies alleged wrongful conduct upon which the share-
holder relies as the basis for a potential derivative action. A First Strike
SLC should be treated as a nullity or as a breach of the directors’ fiduciary
obligation not to waste corporate resources, not as a disinterested voice au-
thoritatively speaking on behalf of the corporation’s shareholders and
directors.
